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The European Constitution and the Relation between
European and Member State Powers
by Wim Voermans and Henk Griffioen
Whereas the future of the European Constitution is still uncertain, the separation of powers
between the EU institutions as well as between the Union and its Member States remains a
crucial issue. The question whether the “Constitutional Treaty” forms a constitution can be
answered positively if the term “constitution” is understood in a broader sense. The European
Constitution reemphasises the existing superiority of the EU legal order to national law, but
does not essentially alter the complex relationships with the Member States’ constitutions. On
the vertical axis of the institutional balance, it elucidates the different kinds of competencies
that evolved from the ECJ case-law and strengthens the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality. On the horizontal axis, it clarifies the dividing lines between legislation, administra-
tion, and the dispensation of justice.
Auch angesichts der unklaren Zukunft der Europäischen Verfassung bleibt das Problem der
Gewaltenteilung sowohl zwischen den Unionsorganen als auch zwischen der EU und ihren
Mitgliedstaaten aktuell. Zunächst lässt sich die Frage, ob der „Verfassungsvertrag“ überhaupt
eine Verfassung ist, positiv beantworten, wenn man von einem breiteren Verständnis des Be-
griffs ausgeht. Die Europäische Verfassung betont den Vorrang des Europarechts vor den natio-
nalen Rechtsordnungen, ändert jedoch das komplexe Verhältnis zu den mitgliedstaatlichen
Verfassungen nicht wesentlich. Auf der vertikalen Dimension des institutionellen Gleich-
gewichts werden die aus dem Richterrecht des EuGH entwickelten Kompetenzkategorien fest-
gehalten und die Prinzipien der Subsidiarität und der Verhältnismäßigkeit gestärkt. Horizon-
tal wird die Unterscheidung zwischen den Aufgaben der Gesetzgebung, der Verwaltung und
der Rechtsprechung klarer herausgearbeitet.
I. Introduction and Apology 
After the French and Dutch “no” votes, obituaries of all sizes and shapes emerged
to commemorate the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereinafter:
European Constitution). Although the current status quo is officially a “reflection
period”, extended until June ,1 the resurrection of the constitutional project
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1 The original deadline for the reflection period passed in June . During the EU summit of . . ,
the European leaders decided – due to the lack of agreement on workable solutions to resolve the consti-
tutional crisis – to extend the reflection period until June .
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in its present form is at most uncertain. Nonetheless, this contribution will tackle
the separation of powers under the European Constitution, for a number of
reasons. It is still fruitful, certainly from a constitutional law point of view, to
examine the ideas and solutions that came to the fore in what remains a unique
constitutional project. This is all the more so since many of these ideas have far
from vanished from the European stage. Interesting suggestions are being made
for adopting various elements of the European Constitution without formal Treaty
amendment. There is, for instance, movement on the Subsidiarity Protocol, no-
tably to install the proposed mechanism for supervision of subsidiarity by nation-
al parliaments.2 Furthermore, some elements of the Constitution have mean-
while received implementation through ordinary means, such as the public nature
of meetings of the Council 3 and the power of the European Parliament to block
decisions taken under Comitology.4 Similar suggestions have been made as regards
the post of minister of foreign affairs of the EU, which could supposedly be
created within the existing Treaty structure as well.5
This so-called “cherry-picking” of the Constitution has also been suggested as
a way to resolve the current constitutional crisis. Elimination or dissociation of
disputed parts of the Constitution and submission of a new, trimmed constitu-
tional document – whether or not labelled “constitution” – may persuade reluc-
tant Member States to ratify vital parts of the European Constitution still. The
French candidate for President, Nicolas Sarkozy, for one, suggested the idea of
drafting a new Treaty that is limited to the “institutional” provisions and subject
to parliamentary ratification only. The former President of the European Con-
vention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, proposed to dissociate the first and second parts
of the European Constitution (which will be ratified via a referendum in the
countries having chosen such a procedure) from the third part which would be
ratified, after the appropriate changes, through a parliamentary procedure.
Perhaps more importantly, the European Court of Justice has, since the elec-
toral debacle of the European Constitution, passed two judgments (in the Pupino
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2 In its London XXXIV meeting of .–. .  the Conference of Community and European Affairs
Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) decided that those National Parliaments
that choose to do so can in future conduct a subsidiarity and proportionality check on a forthcoming EU
legislative proposal or proposals, developing their existing scrutiny role as foreseen in the annex to the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
3 See Council of the European Union: Improving openness and transparency in the Council, / of
. . .
4 Council Decision //EC of . .  amending Decision //EC laying down the procedures
for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJEU No. L / of . . ;
reflecting Article I- Section  European Constitution.
5 See EU Observer of . . .
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and Environmental criminal law-cases) with broad implications and a remarkable
resemblance to elements of the European Constitution.6 To symbolise this ongo-
ing relevance of the European Constitution in the face of misfortune, we have
chosen to refer to it in the present tense.
In this contribution we want to explore the relation between the European and
national constitutions and, in line with this, how the balance of power between
EU institutions and Member States has been realised. Our survey is limited by the
span of our – local – expertise, and the span of this paper. We will predominantly
take the constitutional law point of view in addressing the questions. And al-
though the research is not strictly confined to the Dutch case, the Dutch constitu-
tional system will often be used as an illustration throughout our excursion.
To start off the survey we will deal with the question whether the European
Constitution is a true constitution (section II.), subsequently examine whether
and how the European Constitution takes account of national constitutions (sec-
tion III.), what the relationship is between the European and the national consti-
tutions (section IV.), and how the European Constitution will shape the balance
of powers between the European institutions and the Member States (section V.).
II. Is the European Constitution Actually a Constitution?
Before we can start our tour, an important preliminary question is whether the
European Constitution is actually a constitution. That question has been raised
more and more in the Netherlands, signalling and voicing the popular concern
about being overtaken by a powerful European Federation. The counter-question
is of course: what exactly does one mean by a “constitution”? In the Netherlands
a “constitution” is generally understood as the system of fundamental rules estab-
lishing (state) institutions, public bodies, their mutual relations as well as the
rules which determine under which conditions those bodies are authorised to
perform (legal) acts (including the control mechanisms which ensure that the ru-
les will be enforced and the limits that have been drawn will be complied with).7
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6 The Pupino-judgment (ECJ, judgement of . . , case C-/ (Pupino), rec. , I-) is in line
with the envisaged abolishment of the pillar structure of the EU, because it strongly reinforces the legal
effects of Framework Decisions under the Third Pillar. The judgment in the Environmental crimal law-
case (ECJ, judgement of . . , case C-/ (Commission/Council), rec. , I-) opens the
possibility of harmonising criminal law within the aquis communautaire in a way that resembles the
proposed Article III- Section  European Constitution.
7 This view is for instance reflected in a popular Dutch handbook on constitutional law (Burkens, M.C. et
al. (eds.): Beginselen van de democratische rechtsstaat, Deventer, , ).
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In short it concerns the basic rules of play of the organisation and functioning of
a state. In this concept of “constitution”, there is a close connection between con-
stitution and state. According to some a state is a definite prerequisite for the
existence of any constitution: no state, no constitution.8 Ergo: in the absence of an
underlying state the European Constitution cannot be called a real constitution.
This was the view the signatories to the Dutch parliamentary motion Herben took
in early  when they asked the government no longer to use the term “con-
stitution” for the European Constitutional Treaty, in order to avoid confusion.9
Others argue that the European Constitution cannot be a constitution since it is
laid down in a treaty. This very formal reasoning already fails to convince since
many confederal constitutions and even a few federal ones have been concluded
in a treaty.
For a more in-depth analysis as regards the question whether or not the Euro-
pean Constitution is a constitution, a somewhat broader perspective is helpful. In
modern constitutional literature the concept of constitution is generally used in
three meanings. In its first meaning, the constitution is seen as an act of establish-
ment. In this view the constitution is a legal act establishing a constitutional order.
This could be called a formal concept of constitution,10 which originates in th
century legal thought. In a second meaning constitution is also perceived as a
system of rules aimed at the limitation of government power. According to this
functional view a constitution aims in particular at the attribution and limitation
of government powers, the regulation and limitation of the public exercise of
power. “Constitution” in this meaning is closely related to the central tenets of
constitutionalism. In a third view, which is sometimes referred to as the political
concept of constitution, a constitution is exclusively bound up with the national
state. This perception is closely related to the idea of popular sovereignty. Accord-
ing to this latter widespread view a constitution is in particular a political act: an
expression of the will of a sovereign people or nation to manifest itself as an
independent political entity (self-determination) and to organise itself for this
purpose as a state (constitutional autonomy). According to this line of reasoning
a constitution not merely presupposes a state (in short: territory, population,
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8 Geelhoed calls this the formal dogmatic state-oriented view of the concept of constitution which is
advocated by some in the German constitutional doctrine, he cites Pache and Pernice as examples (Geel-
hoed, L. A.: Een Europawijde Europese Unie: een grondwet zonder staat?, in: SEW. Tijdschrift voor
Europees en economisch recht, / (), –, here ).
9 See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar –: Europese Raad, -, no.  of . .
.
10 Barents, R.: Hoe constitutioneel is de Grondwet voor Europa?, in: SEW. Tijdschrift voor Europees en
economisch recht, / (), –.
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effective exercise of authority), but a state which is the expression of the will of a
nation or people which wants to unite and organise itself into a state. This politi-
cally normative view of the concept of constitution is perhaps most eloquently
expressed in the preamble to the US Constitution.11 Not surprisingly, this view is
very common in the United States, where the US Constitution and the US consti-
tutional system are quite commonly perceived as the gold standard of good con-
stitutional practice. It is against that background that Weiler’s comments on the
European Constitution may perhaps be understood: “If a ‘constitution’ by anyth-
ing other than a European constitutant power,” he notes, “it will be a treaty
masquerading as a constitution.” 12 However, the latter view is put into perspective
by less fervent believers: The role of the state as the unique source and legitimisa-
tion of law is questioned widely nowadays 13 and the phenomenon of post- or ex-
tranational constitutionalism challenges the idea of state monopoly on lawmak-
ing.14
It is clear from all this that the concept of constitution does not have a unique
meaning. Set along the measuring rod of the existing concepts it emerges that the
European Constitution is both in the first and the second meaning of the concept
a fully-fledged constitution.15 In addition it may well be argued that notably the
EC already exists in “constitutional” form, even without a written source of that
name.
III. Reference to National Constitutions in the European Constitution 
How does the European Constitution relate to national constitutions? A first step
on that road is to look whether national constitutions are mentioned in the Euro-
pean Constitution. In a number of cases the European Constitution does indeed
mention national constitutions. For instance, Article I- refers directly to them by
stating that the Union will respect the equality of Member States before the Con-
stitution as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental struc-
tures, political and constitutional. Article I- ensures the primacy of the law of the
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11 Weiler, J.H.H.: In Defence of the Status quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg, in: id./Wind, M. (eds.):
European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, Cambridge, , –.
12 Ibid.
13 For an overview see van Bijsterveld, S.: The Empty Throne. Democracy and the Rule of Law in Transition,
Utrecht, , ,  ff.
14 Walker, N.: Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation, in: Weiler, J. H. H./Wind, M.
(eds.), op. cit., –.
15 Barents, R.: Een grondwet voor Europa, Deventer, , .
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Union, but does not say anything about the national constitutions. However,
Article II- explicitly refers to such constitutions. The article provides that the
fundamental rights from Part II of the European Constitution must not be inter-
preted as restricting fundamental freedoms included in national constitutions.16
The European Constitution further contains a number of references to national
constitutions within the framework of the national ratification of EU decisions or
agreements. Article I-, for instance, calls on the Member States – in case a
common defence policy will be established – to take a national decision in
accordance with their constitutional provisions in order that this common de-
fence policy can be implemented. Of course it will depend on the national pro-
visions whether or not this must be done in the form of ratification. Article I-
also anticipates such a possibility: if a draft European law lays down provisions
relating to the own resources of the Union that have the possible consequence of
creating new categories of resources, such a law will have to be approved in
accordance with the national constitutional provisions. Article I- provides that
accession agreements with new Member States must be ratified by all Member
States, in accordance with their constitutions. Withdrawal too (Article I-) can
only be effected in accordance with the constitutional provisions of a Member
State.
The possible extension of the citizenship rights of Article I- must also be
approved by the Member States according to their own constitutional rules, as
must adjustments by European law laying down rules for the election of members
of the European Parliament, amendments to the European Constitution, revi-
sions of the internal policy and of action of the Union. Finally the European
Constitution itself must also be ratified (Article IV-). Even though in the rest
of the text the European Constitution frequently refers to itself, there are no fur-
ther references to national constitutions.
IV. Relation between European Constitution and National Constitutions
At this instance, with a difficult ratification process either having come to a grind-
ing halt or still being underway in some Member States, the national constitu-
tions are obviously very important. But this is no surprise, bearing in mind that
the adoption of the European Constitution is formally still to be seen as the adop-
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16 This is a rather common provision in human rights treaties. As examples see Article  International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights and Article  European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
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tion of a treaty. A wholly different matter is to what degree the national constitu-
tions will be of importance in the actual operation of the European Constitution,
once it is adopted. The fact that it has been interpreted as a fully-fledged consti-
tution already suggests that the role of national constitutions will be secondary.
As we have seen, the European Constitution grants the national constitutions
various points of impact. Most notably, there is the simplified revision procedure
of Article IV- which allows for the revision of Title III of Part III – the legal
bases for Union action – without convening an IGC, but which retains the de-
mand of ratification in accordance with the national constitutions, just as the
ordinary revision procedure of Article IV- does. The national constitutions
also remain important in more general respects. The European Constitution will
not radically change the existing state of affairs in which the prime responsibility
for the implementation of Union law rests on the Member States and the au-
thorities therein. It is a matter of dispute to what extent these national authorities
can still be understood as national authorities in their role as a European execu-
tive. Common parlance has long been that national authorities are to be seen as
Union authorities when in pursuit of Union objectives. It is clear that national
(constitutional) law must grant these national authorities the adequate means to
fulfil this responsibility in order not to be in breach of EU-law, notably the
principle of sincere cooperation (Article  TEC). In addition to Article I-() –
the principle of sincere cooperation – the European Constitution will also forma-
lise the obligation to enact all necessary measures to implement legally binding
Union acts (Article I-). But, on the other hand, it is equally clear that EU-law
will not fill in the exact statute and competences of these national authorities
itself. In other words, one could say that even after the adoption of the European
Constitution, the complex landscape that Pernice has coined “multilevel constitu-
tionalism” remains.17
The question of the continued importance of the national constitutions can
also be asked in a more – dare we say – metaphysical way. This is the question of
the ultimate source of public authority. It is not uncommon in the constitution-
alist tradition – notably in what we have identified as the formal conception of
the constitution – to postulate that all public authority emanates from the na-
tional constitution.18 This postulate logically precludes that any transfer of sover-
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17 Pernice, I.: Multilevel constitutionalism in the European Union, in: European Law Review, / (),
–.
18 For an example of this rationale see, apart from the famous Maastricht-Urteil of the German Bundes-
verfassungsgericht, its recent judgment about the reception of the law of the European Convention of
Human Rights in the German legal order: Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgement of . . ,  BvR
/.
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eignty has irreversible effects. Set alongside the doctrines on the nature of the
European legal order that the ECJ has long promoted, this particular constitu-
tional rationale seems in direct contradiction, notably with the continuous case-
law of the ECJ concerning the subordination of all national law, including consti-
tutional law 19, to the (goals of the) EU legal order. There is no legal solution to
the contradiction that can thus be constructed from the perspective of some of
the Member States’ constitutions (notably Germany).20 The European Constitu-
tion does not alter this situation; rather it reemphasises the superiority of the EU
legal order. The most important article is undoubtedly Article I- which provides
that the Constitution and the other law of the European Union will have primacy
over the law of the Member States. As has been shown, this provision may be
troublesome for certain Member States because of the nature of their national
constitutions.21 For the Netherlands it does not entail any special problems, since
it has long been established that both Primary and Secondary Community Law
has independent (by virtue of its autonomous nature) binding force in the Dutch
legal order, regardless of the Dutch Constitution.22
In addition to the primacy rule mentioned the principle of the institutional
balance is also important for the relation between the European and the Dutch
constitutional order. The principle of institutional balance implies that powers
cannot be exclusively exercised by one body, but always by several cooperating
bodies, in order to avoid abuse of power and arbitrariness.23 This form of distri-
bution of powers somewhat resembles the system of “checks and balances”, al-
though it cannot be identified with it. As a Community principle – derived from
the system of the Treaty – institutional balance does not in the first place govern
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19 Already apparent in ECJ, judgement of . . , case C-/ (Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH/
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel), rec. , .
20 La Torre, M.: Legal Pluralism as an Evolutionary Achievement of European Community Law, in: Sny-
der, F. (ed.): The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration, Oxford, ,
–.
21 Certainly in those countries which have as basic principle that the national constitution is the foundation
for the validity of all law in the national legal order. For an overview of such countries (Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Spain, Greece, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Denmark, each of them in different modalities) see
Kortmann, C. A. J. M.: Secundair gemeenschapsrecht en de nationale constitutie, in: SEW. Tijdschrift
voor Europees en economisch recht, / (), –. For a very extensive discussion about the nature
of the Community legal order and its relation to the legal orders of the Member States under the old
Treaties, see Barents, R.: De communautaire rechtsorde, Deventer,  and Claes, M.: The National
Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution, Oxford/Portland, .
22 Articles  and  Dutch Constitution establish a (monistic) system in which provisions of treaties and
of resolutions by international institutions (like the EU), which may be binding on all persons by virtue
of their contents, are in fact directly binding on everyone in the Netherlands once they have been
published. Such provisions are not only directly binding, they also have presidence over national Dutch
law.
23 Barents, R.: Een grondwet, op. cit., .
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the relation between the traditional government powers we know from the Trias
Politica, but in the context of the Community it governs in particular the relation
between, and especially the respective prerogatives of, the legislating and policy-
making Community institutions. The practical effect of the principle – as devel-
oped in case law 24 – is that when exercising their respective powers, each of these
Community institutions depends on the cooperation of another institution, be it
by way of codecision, supervision or answerability. The Council cannot legislate
without an initiative of the Commission, the Parliament cannot legislate without
an initiative of the Commission and the cooperation of the Council, the Com-
mission is answerable to Parliament. Member States implement Union law and
policies under supervision of the Commission, etc. Even though the principle of
institutional balance is solely concerned with the relationships between the legis-
lative and policy-making Community institutions, it is in some way relevant for
the relationships vis-à-vis the Member States insofar as it protects the prerogati-
ves of the institutions, which can either be typified as intergovernmental (Coun-
cil, European Council) or communitarian (Commission, Parliament, ECB etc.).25
Therefore shifts in the institutional balance have immediate repercussions for the
balance of power of e.g. large and small Member States.26 The principle of subsi-
diarity to some extent expresses the same underlying principle as institutional
balance.
Over the years the system of institutional balance has penetrated ever deeper
into the constitutional fabric of the European Community and later of the Euro-
pean Union 27 and now seems to have – as a kind of blueprint standard 28 – ob-
tained a firm footing in the European Constitution.29 Institutional balance was a
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24 Prechal, S.: Institutional Balance: A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents, in: Heukels, T./Blokker, N./
Brus, M. (eds.): The European Union after Amsterdam, The Hague, , –.
25 However, it is uncommon that the prerogatives of the Council have to be protected vis-à-vis the other
institutions. Commonly, it is the other way around. See, e.g. ECJ, judgement of . . , case C-/
(Commission/Council), rec. , I-.
26 Barents, R.: Een grondwet, op. cit., .
27 Mainly the First Pillar.
28 Just as in many other constitutions, the principle has not been laid down as a standard, but it has been a
guiding principle in organising the relation and the attribution of the powers to the various bodies.
29 Barents draws attention to two fundamental – sometimes opposing – changes which the system of the
institutional balance has undergone on EC level in the course of time. The first development is: inter-
governmentalisation (to be inferred from the rise of the European Council and comitology) and the se-
cond parliamentarisation (the rise of influence of the European parliament). That development has not
yet ended. Although in  by the amendment of the Comitology resolution (Council Decision /
/EC of . .  laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on
the Commission, OJEU no. L / of . . ) and now also in the European Constitution it has been
tried to slightly break the hold which the Member States have on delegated legislation and implementation
rules by the Commission by bringing certain implementation rules more under the control of the Euro-
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very prominent catch-phrase in the discussions in the Convention. On the other
hand, one could wonder whether the evasive political notion of institutional ba-
lance is actually the same as the judicial version.30 The principle of institutional
balance has a more restricted meaning in the case-law of the EC Court of Justice,
even though it originally comes from that source. The Court seems to be reluc-
tant to read an over-arching principle of separation of powers into the Treaties,31
simply because the Treaties themselves are ambiguous in this respect. Still, we
contend that an over-aching principle of separation of powers is gradually taking
shape to such a degree that one can speak of a “blueprint standard”. In the Euro-
pean Constitution the scope of the principle no longer seems to be exclusively
reserved to the relation between legislator and executive or administration (which
because of their close connection are nowadays sometimes seen as a sort of one
joint government power),32 but also regards the relation of the latter two to the
judiciary. Although the European judiciary (i.e. at the Union level primarily the
Court of Justice of the European Union)33 (see Article I-) is independent, the
judges are appointed by the Member States for only six years. The concept of
institutional balance presents itself in the new constitutional system by the very
fact that courts in the Member States are not subordinate to the EC Court of
Justice, but independently apply Community law, without the possibility of a Eu-
ropean appeal, all this within the framework of a cooperative system (i.e. the sys-
tem of the preliminary rulings). Furthermore, the EC Court of Justice can rule on
the legality of (legislative) acts of the institutions (see Article III-), in an (in-
creasing) number of cases even in response to an appeal by an individual citizen
(see Article III-). But this is running ahead of things.
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pean Parliament, the question is whether the Parliament will succeed in actually effecting such control by
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32 Koopmans, T.: Courts and Political Institutions. A Comparative View, Cambridge, ,  ff.
33 Member state judges have to apply community law as well and constitute – in that sense – a part of the
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For where do we find true and direct evidence of that model of institutional
balance in the European Constitution? It manifests itself, insofar as we can see, on
the two axes of the constitutional structure of the Union: the vertical axis (i.e. the
relation between the European institutions and the Member States) and the hori-
zontal axis (relation between the European institutions themselves).
V. Balance of Powers under the European Constitution
1. Institutional Balance on the Vertical Axis
The principle of institutional balance is, in the form in which it has been crafted
by the ECJ, concerned with the delimitation of the powers of the institutions of
the European Union. One should, in this context, not read “delimitation of pow-
ers” with the connotation of the traditional separation of powers into the legisla-
tive, the executive and the judiciary. It is generally acknowledged that the EC/EU
legal order fails to correspond with this traditional theory.34 The delimitation
which the ECJ has brought about has a far more detailed meaning. The ECJ has
sought to guarantee the prerogatives of the institutions vis-à-vis each other. How-
ever, the prerogatives of the institutions vary greatly, depending on the specific
legal basis of the measure in question. As a result of this fragmentation of differ-
ent legal bases, there is no single conception of the relations between the institu-
tions inherent in the Treaties. At the same time, the complexity of the legal bases
and the legal instruments of the EC/EU has been one of the reasons for convening
the Convention on the Future of Europe, as is apparent from the Laeken Declara-
tion. Two of the objectives of the constitutional project were to rethink the divi-
sion of competences between the Union and the Member States, and to strive for
simplification of the instruments of the Union. On the theme of institutional
balance, these two strands come together, because it is the complexity of the sys-
tem of legal bases that has caused the division of competences to become ever-
more opaque, provoking even the European Council of Laeken to use the some-
what paranoid notion of “creeping expansion” of competences. However, it soon
became apparent in the Convention that the rethinking of the division of com-
petences would wield neither a substantial shift of competences nor even a differ-
ent model, but rather would affirm the case-law of the ECJ on this matter and
ZSE  ⁄  35
34 See Lenaerts, K.: Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community, in: Com-
mon Market Law Review, / (), –; van Bijsterveld, S., op. cit.
The European Constitution and the Power Relation
strive at elucidation only.35 The passages of the European Constitution about the
division of competences will be discussed below. At face value, the Constitution
will change little with respect to the fundamental principles of the division of
competences, when compared to the current situation. However, we will take the
perspective of the institutional balance in a broader sense, and assess whether
there may be broader implications for the horizontal and vertical division of
competences than may at first be perceived.
Under the European Constitution, the demarcation of powers between the
Member States on the one hand and the Union on the other hand is governed by
the principle of conferral. That is to say that the Union can only exercise the
powers that have been expressly granted to it by the Constitution. This exercise of
powers will in turn be governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportion-
ality (see Article I-). The principle of conferral – an expression of the notion of
legality 36 – is of a fundamental nature: neither the Union, nor its institutions can
act if such authority has not been granted to them either directly or indirectly by
the Constitution. It is difficult to reconcile this principle with the phenomena of
implied powers and flexibility clauses,37 for it implies that if the Constitution fails
to allocate a power, the Member States are still competent, as Article I-() now
expressly states. The existence of the principle of conferral – otherwise known as
the principle of attributed competences – is quite obvious from the standpoint of
the law of international organisations. It is, however, open to debate whether this
principle has a substantial meaning in the context of the EC/EU and under the
European Constitution. After all, the abovementioned “creeping expansion” of
competences has not been hindered by the operation of this principle, which has
been in place since the outset of the E(E)C.38 It is no coincidence that in legal
writing it has already been en vogue for some time to characterise the European
legal order as constitutional. The fact that the EC/EU legal order can be perceived
as constitutional has a lot to do with the perception that the current EC/EU has
an autonomous thrust that goes much further than the explicit provisions of the
Treaties. In part, this can be explained from the specific nature of the central
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tenets of economic integration: the directly applicable prohibitions to hinder the
freedom of movement (of capital, workers, goods, and services). These provisions
serve to protect the internal market; but their uniqueness lies in the fact that they
touch on every conceivable field of social activity. They function so to speak hori-
zontally, cutting through all fields of government regulation.39 For example: when
the national authorities grant permission for a demonstration on a principal
highway, this can be a breach of the free movement of goods.40 That is why it is
virtually impossible to point out a field of regulation which is kept wholly un-
touched by EC law. The ECJ has accommodated the spreading out of EC-com-
petences along these lines.41 Apart from these very general and far-reaching provi-
sions there are many more concrete provisions (i.e. legal bases) that concern spe-
cific competences in specific fields. The discrepancy between these different forms
of competence leads Barents to state that the law of the Union is also relevant in
fields in which the Union has no competences. This is most likely to be the back-
ground of Lenaerts’ famous statement that “[t]here is simply no nucleus of sover-
eignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community”.42 The
European Constitution will change little in this respect.
What the European Constitution does do is elucidate the different kinds of
competence, as they have evolved from the case-law of the ECJ. In this connection
the European Constitution contains four kinds of powers, viz:
• exclusive competence, which implies that in such areas only the Union can act
as legislator and adopt legal acts, and that the Member States are no longer
allowed to take any action, unless it concerns the implementation of Com-
munity policy or unless they have been explicitly authorised by the Union;
• shared (or competing) competence, implying that both the Union and the
Member States can act in such areas, so long as the Union has at any rate not
exercised its power, for in that case the competence of the Member States will
cease;
• coordinating competence, which means that the Union is authorised to coordi-
nate parts of the economic policy and the employment and social policy of the
Member States via the adoption of (global) guidelines in the Council of Minis-
ters; and
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• supporting (supplementary) competence, which implies that, if the need for this
exists, the Union can supplement, coordinate or support the action of the
Member States in a certain area, as regards the European dimension, however
without taking over the competence of the Member States in that area.
From this list only the exclusive competences fall outside the scope of application
of the subsidiarity principle. As regards the exercise of all other powers, the rule
applies that the Union will not make use of its powers if the Member States them-
selves are better able to achieve the goals associated with the action. Furthermore,
Union action must have added value regarding the scope or the consequences of
the intended action. Union action must not go further than necessary to attain
the objectives set out in the Constitution, according to Article I-. It can be said
that none of the provisions of Title V of Part I (“Exercise of Union competence”)
change anything in the EC/EU law, because they contain no specific bases of com-
petence but only common principles which have already been expounded by the
ECJ. The concrete bases for lawful action are situated in Part III of the European
Constitution.
The principle of institutional balance has also been incorporated into the way
in which the Member States participate in the decision-making. At various places
in the Constitution – the proportion of votes in the Council and European Coun-
cil (see in particular the hard-won Article I-), and the composition of the Com-
mission – a fair balance between the interests of the large and small Members
States has been aimed at. The experiences with the Treaty of Nice have taught that
effectiveness and fair balance may be incompatible. The balance achieved by the
European Constitution concerning decision-making with a qualified majority is
a provisional compromise with a combination of old-style majority decision-
making, and the variables of the number of Member States voting in favour (at
least  percent), their spread and representation (at least  Member States), and
the size of the population (at least  percent of the population of the Union).
Barents rightly points out that the principle of institutional balance is a
dynamic principle.43 That also applies to its result. The question is therefore also
whether it has been sensible to lay down the calculation rules for a qualified ma-
jority in the European Constitution. After all Part I cannot be amended just like
that if the Member States wished to do so. The major convention method of
Article I- will then have to be followed. Has the proportion of votes – chosen
under pressure and without having any experience with it – in this way not been
sculptured too much in constitutional marble – or even granite? As far as we are
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concerned, Article III- has been put together in a constitutionally more sensi-
ble way – on an equally controversial point: the seat of the European Union.
The preoccupation with balance on the vertical axis can also be found in the
share which the national parliaments have in safeguarding the principles of subsi-
diarity and proportionality under the European Constitution. The Protocol on
the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union gives the parliaments of
the Member States the power to raise a red flag (give a reasoned opinion) in case
draft legislation of the Commission supposedly exceeds the limits of subsidiarity
and proportionality. If one third of the Member State parliaments conclude that
such limits have been exceeded, the Commission must reconsider the proposal.44
If we reflect on this, about nine national parliaments must – within a period of
six weeks – advise negatively for a proposal to be halted. Bearing in mind the
general lack of interest of national parliaments in detailed European files (such as
many legislative proposals) and the very hesitant and limited communication
among these parliaments, this will not be a guaranteed success. Even in the case
of the very controversial Services Directive 45 the discussion in the Member States
has only gotten underway long after the six week period had passed.
In Europe institutional balance on the vertical axis is also aimed at by assigning
the processes of policy preparation and policy adoption to the European institu-
tions and implementation of the policy to the Member States. The European
Commission then monitors the implementation.46 This system did not always
turn out to be effective in the past decades. The policy process is too one-dimen-
sional and problems in the implementation practice are insufficiently related
back and therefore insufficiently recognised and dealt with. Consequently there
are also hidden losses.47 One of the remedies which the European Constitution
employs against this is the possibility to let the Commission direct the implemen-
tation by Member States by adopting uniform rules.48 Outside the Constitution
the Union tries to keep a closer watch on the implementation by the Member
States by the formation of European agencies, which also monitor the application
of EC law.
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2. Institutional Balance on the Horizontal Axis
We shall be brief about the relations between the EU institutions on the horizon-
tal level. It is important to note here that the European Constitution makes, more
than was the case in the Treaties preceding it, a distinction between the govern-
ment functions of legislation, administration and dispensation of justice. Eyes
that must get used to Brussels light will have to blink a few times, but the leverage
point for the separation between the functions of legislation and administration
can be found in Articles I- to I-. In those articles a distinction is made be-
tween legislative acts and implementing (or: non-legislative) acts. The legislative
function is exercised via so-called legislative acts. In that connection the Euro-
pean Constitution contains a strictly formal concept of legislation: i.e. legislative
acts consist of the process which – according to the procedure of Article III-
or according to a specific procedure – leads to the adoption of European laws or
European framework laws. In this European legislative process laws and frame-
work laws are adopted by the Council and the European Parliament on a proposal
of the Commission. The Commission here has the exclusive right of initiative.
Council and Parliament cannot take the initiative – apart from a few small
exceptions 49 –, but only propose amendments. The Constitution does not set any
requirements as regards the substance of European laws and framework laws.
There is no constitutional obstacle for a European framework law containing
standards that are addressed to only one actor in an individual Member State. An
administrative decision in the form of a European law is – in principle – con-
ceivable. Neither does the Constitution set requirements as regards the substance
of delegated “legislation” by virtue of Article I-. If the European (framework)
legislator has delegated a regulatory power, and that power is used, the result will
be something which would be very confusing for most continental constitutional
lawyers, especially the Dutch ones. That result is actually called a delegated regu-
lation, which in the system of the European Constitution is a non-legislative act,
yet which may contain universally binding provisions, and is in principle also an
administrative decision.50 Matters become yet more complex if we consider that
under the European Constitution there can be three kinds of regulation: the
organic-law regulation (directly based on the Constitution), the delegated regula-
tion (by virtue of Article I-) and the implementing regulation (by virtue of Ar-
ticle I-).51
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As in the old system, under the European Constitution it is not easy to deter-
mine who is charged with the government function of administration. The opin-
ions about this also differ.52 In any case Article I- instructs Member States to
implement legally binding Union acts. The Member States will adopt “all meas-
ures of national law” necessary for this. This points to a strongly legal bias for the
function of administration.53 However if we read that provision in conjunction
with Article I- (), in which the loyalty to the Community – the principle of
sincere cooperation – has been laid down, it can be inferred from it that “imple-
menting” does not stop at taking legal measures, but includes more. So in prin-
ciple the Member States are charged with the European administration, unless the
Commission is charged with it by primary or secondary Union law (e.g. super-
vision). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union and, as the occasion arises,
European agencies can also be charged with the implementation of Union law.
A striking feature is that the functions of legislation and administration are
strongly interwoven and have been made interdependent. The implementers (the
Member States) sit at the table when the decisions are adopted which they them-
selves have to implement, but in order to ensure that when doing so they will not
lose sight of the European interest, they have no right of initiative and the Com-
mission supervises their implementation. The Commission is in turn accountable
to the European Parliament and also requires the confidence of that forum. And
there are numerous more specific mutual connections like that. Never one cheek
by one jowl, but often one cheek by two or three jowls.
The function of dispensing justice is somewhat more separated. The function
of dispensing justice is exercised by the judiciary of the Union (consisting of the
Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, specialised courts and courts in the
Member States). The function of dispensing justice can only partly be found in
Article III-, which instructs the Court of Justice to review the legality of the
acts of the European institutions. The fact that judges in the Member States must
apply Union law and must adjudicate disputes arising from Union law has no-
where been codified, but has been implied.54 Within the framework of the insti-
tutional balance – we will also involve the judiciary in this, although that is not
yet common – it is important to see that the European judiciary is a subtle col-
laborative arrangement of courts of Member States and of the Union. The Court
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of Justice is independent, but the judges – one from every Member State – have a
term of office of only six years. Moreover, they are appointed by mutual agree-
ment between the Member States. The judges in the Court of First Instance also
have a limited term of office. This rapid rotation is a good counterpart for the
important powers which the Court has in reviewing the acts of the Member States
and the EU institutions – including the legislative acts.
There is still much more that can be said about the way in which the checks
and balances in the European Constitution have been organised, but for the sur-
vey carried out here it is relevant that we can establish that the principle of insti-
tutional balance has deeply penetrated into the fabric of the European consti-
tutional system. According to the precepts of institutional balance, the European
government functions on the horizontal level are always exercised by segmented
bodies which must cooperate in order to arrive at policy or at decisions. Policy-
making and decision-making therefore almost necessarily take place along the
lines of the consensus model instead of the majority model. The new decision-
making procedures as such cannot much alter that situation.
VI. Enfin
The no-vote in the Dutch referendum caught most observers by surprise. The
Netherlands were until recently renowned for their Euro-enthusiasm. Now they
are suddenly in a position, together with the French, of having stopped the Euro-
pean Constitution in its tracks, and causing a crippling crisis. The final analysis
of the Dutch “no” must still be made, but it appears that a combination of a long
standing culture of political neglect of EU issues, a general lack of trust in the
government and the dynamics of a nation-wide referendum 55 –  years after the
last “real” constitutional referendum 56 – have created an unique set of circum-
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stances.57 This may also explain the paradoxical feat that in December   %
of the Dutch voters indicated that they were in favour of a European Constitution
and in a poll held some weeks after the referendum (June ) the same voters
were even more enthusiastic about the European Union and European integra-
tion than they were in . As to the course of action after the “no”, the Dutch
government is in dire straits. But a constitutional future for the EU, roughly along
the lines of the European Constitution, is still very feasible, even for the Nether-
lands.58 This in the first place because the present European Constitution consists
for the most part of EC and EU law already in effect; the European Constitution
is largely a recast of the existing Treaties and a codification of the case law of the
European Court of Justice. The European Constitution enshrines the constitu-
tional aquis of the Union. Secondly, the Court of Justice will, with or without the
European Constitution, elaborate the EU’s constitutional aquis in its case law. It
did so in the past and will do this in the future. The recent judgements in the
Pupino and Environmental criminal law-cases (see the introduction) provide
evidence for that position. Studying the impact of European constitutional law on
national law and national constitutions – be it in or outside the wrapping of a
European Constitution – is (still) highly relevant, especially where the Dutch
referendum case shows that a lack of information or insight in the consequences
of EU law can create a (contra-productive) awareness shock.
What can be learnt from the present survey into the relation between the Euro-
pean and the Member State Constitutions? In the first place it is evident that the
European Constitution is a constitution which builds on the constitutional tradi-
tions of the Member States in more or less the same way as the American Consti-
tution did in its time. And even though the word “federation” is under a taboo,
the European Constitution is as much or as little a federation as the American
federation was on  May  in Philadelphia. The fact is that federations are not
ordained by constitutions, but rather emanate from political and societal realities.
The survey also illustrates that the European Constitution takes account of na-
tional constitutions, but even more of national constitutional systems. The con-
stitutional system of the Union is interwoven with that of the Member States: the
functions of legislation, administration and dispensation of justice are always
exercised in joint productions of institutions of the Member States and the
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Union. In that sense the European Union is not a classical federal system, since
the separation between what belongs to the federation and what to the Member
States has not been implemented in a conventional way. Although the powers of
the Union and the Member States have been delimited from each other, in the
exercise of these powers there is close cooperation between institutions of the
Union and of the Member States. In the third place, the system of European
constitutional law, as it has now been codified to a large extent in the European
Constitution, has led to a entwinement of mutual dependencies on the horizontal
(between the EU institutions) and vertical level (between EU and Member Sta-
tes). The functions of legislation, administration and dispensation of justice –
according to the blueprint standard of the institutional balance – have been made
interdependent in order to achieve a balance of power. That is a new situation, for
under the system of the EC and EU Treaties, those government functions could
not so clearly be distinguished. The legislative function is distinctly new in the
European Constitution.
New government functions come with new government powers in the Euro-
pean Constitution. This begs the question how and according to what norms and
principles the mutual relations of the institutions of the EU are governed. One
might argue that no other general principles or norms apply to this relation than
can be found in the individual provisions of the Treaty, or – on the contrary – that
fundamental constitutional principles derived from the concept of the rule of law
or Rechtsstaat overarch the different Treaty provisions that govern relations
between the individual institutions. We perceive the principle of the institutional
balance (together with the principles of institutional autonomy and loyal coope-
ration) as the basic and underlying pattern of European distribution of power in
the European Constitution. This enables not only a better understanding of the
background and the system of the Constitution, but is also in line with the way
the Court of Justice applies these principles. It is most likely that the Court will
use this principle as a norm.59 If an institution fails to take into account the prero-
gatives of another institution when exercising its powers, the decisions resulting
from this can be declared null and void by the Court in appeal proceedings be-
cause of violation of the institutional balance. A possible important test case is
the future of the comitology under the Constitution. Will it be resurrected under
Article I-, or under Article I- and would the Court of Justice be able to put a
stop to it since Article I-(), one might argue, no longer leaves any room for it? 60
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59 Barents, R.: Een grondwet, op. cit., .
60 If we may believe the documents of the Convention, it was not the intention that the comitology would
continue to exist under Article I-.
A B H A N D L U N G E N  /  A N A LY S E S
Or will, as is often the case, constitutional practice dictate the constitutional rule?
If the Constitution will ever come about, the problem of the distribution and
spread of power will become an interesting one.61 And the more so, if it does not
come about.
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61 In the Leiden research programme Trias Europea we study the question whether and to which extent the
European Constitution will change the distribution of powers between the EU institutions themselves
and their relation to the Member States. This contribution was also written within that framework.
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